On September 17, 2024, Lebanon was shaken by a series of simultaneous explosions involving electronic pagers, resulting in a tragic toll of 12 deaths and over 2,700 injuries. The following day, a second wave of explosions, this time from detonated walkie-talkies, further destabilized the region. These attacks appeared to be specifically targeted at members of Hezbollah, a prominent militant group.
Reports from U.S. officials cited by The New York Times indicated that the pager attacks were orchestrated by Israeli operatives. Explosives were reportedly planted within the communication devices as part of a covert operation targeting Hezbollah’s supply chain. Hezbollah had recently placed an order for a shipment of pagers, unknowingly procuring devices that had been weaponized.
This tactic of supply chain infiltration is not a novel approach in the world of espionage and military operations. A declassified 2010 National Security Agency (NSA) document revealed instances where the U.S. agency intercepted computer hardware intended for foreign clients. These devices were then modified with malware or surveillance tools before being repackaged and delivered to their unsuspecting recipients. This method contrasts with device-specific targeting, such as the 1996 assassination of a Hamas bombmaker by Israeli Shin Bet, where explosives were secretly placed within a cellphone.
Hezbollah’s increased reliance on pagers emerged after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. This shift towards simpler communication technologies, like pagers and walkie-talkies, suggests a deliberate strategy by Hezbollah to counter Israel’s advanced surveillance capabilities, which are particularly effective at tracking individuals through their smartphones. By adopting low-tech methods, Hezbollah aimed to gain a tactical advantage.
Debris of exploded walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah, showcasing the aftermath of targeted attacks on their low-tech communication devices.
The Double-Edged Sword of Cellphone Technology: Tracking and Vulnerability
From a cybersecurity expert perspective, mobile phones are powerful tracking tools for various entities, including governments, commercial organizations, criminals, and even mobile service providers. Cellphone tracking has become instrumental in combating terrorism, locating missing persons, and solving criminal cases. For instance, cellular technology played a crucial role in dismantling global terror networks by tracking communications and movements. Similarly, law enforcement agencies routinely use cell phone data to locate missing individuals and gather evidence in criminal investigations.
However, the same tracking capabilities that make cellphones useful also create significant privacy vulnerabilities. The ease with which mobile phones can be tracked allows for the recording of personal movements, raising concerns about potential misuse. While legitimate uses include parental monitoring and commercial advertising, nefarious applications range from spying on individuals to tracking activists and journalists. Even the U.S. military has expressed concerns about the potential tracking of soldiers through their mobile devices in sensitive locations, highlighting the pervasive nature of this vulnerability.
Mobile device tracking is achieved through multiple methods. Network location data, generated as phones interact with cell towers or specialized devices like Stingrays (used by law enforcement to mimic cell towers), provides a constant stream of location information. Furthermore, smartphone operating systems and downloaded applications often incorporate tracking features, frequently buried within lengthy privacy policies or terms of service that users often overlook.
The data harvested through these tracking methods is a valuable commodity. It is sometimes sold to governments and data brokers for further analysis and user profiling. Modern smartphones are equipped with Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and GPS, enabling precise location tracking both terrestrially and via satellite networks. These technologies, designed for user convenience, ironically contribute to the ease of tracking. Real-time or near real-time tracking can be accomplished using techniques ranging from traditional radio direction-finding to sophisticated intelligence satellites, drones, and “man-in-the-middle” tools like Stingrays. Malware such as Pegasus, developed by the Israeli cyber-arms firm NSO Group, can also be deployed to remotely monitor a device’s location.
Even without sophisticated technology, user location can be inferred from internet activity, website logs, social media metadata, or by purchasing aggregated location data from data brokers. Recognizing these vulnerabilities, Hezbollah’s leader had previously cautioned members against using cellphones, acknowledging that “surveillance devices are in your pockets,” underscoring the inherent tracking risks associated with smartphones. Research has consistently demonstrated how seemingly innocuous features in mobile devices can be exploited to track and even predict individual movements, often without the user’s full awareness of the extent of data collection.
The Strategic Advantage of Low-Tech: Why Pagers Offer Security
Unlike cellphones, one-way pagers present a significant challenge to tracking efforts. A pager designed solely to receive messages does not transmit signals that can be readily used to pinpoint its location. This fundamental difference is the core reason behind Hezbollah’s strategic shift to pagers. By adopting this low-tech communication method, Hezbollah aimed to make it considerably more difficult for Israeli intelligence to track their operatives, thereby motivating the alleged Israeli operation targeting their pager supply chain.
The effectiveness of low-tech tactics in evading sophisticated surveillance is not a new concept. The prolonged inability of technologically superior Western intelligence agencies to locate Osama bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks serves as a stark reminder. Bin Laden and al-Qaida deliberately avoided digital communication, relying instead on low-tech methods and human couriers, effectively creating an intelligence gap that proved difficult to bridge.
In asymmetric conflicts, adversaries employing low-tech strategies often find success against more technologically advanced and well-resourced opponents. This principle was vividly illustrated in the U.S. military’s Millennium Challenge 2002 war game. The “Red Force,” representing an insurgency and led by Marine General Paul van Riper, utilized low-tech tactics, including motorcycle couriers instead of cellphones, to evade the “Blue Force’s” high-tech surveillance. The Red team’s surprising victory in the initial phase of the exercise, achieved within 24 hours, forced a controversial scenario reset to ensure a Blue team win, highlighting the disruptive potential of low-tech approaches against high-tech military forces.
Lessons in Security: From Hezbollah’s Tactics to Everyday Life
Hezbollah and al-Qaida’s preference for avoiding smartphones offers a valuable lesson for everyone: in our digitally connected world, various entities are likely tracking us in numerous ways for diverse purposes. The reported Israeli response to Hezbollah’s adoption of pagers further underscores a critical cybersecurity principle: any device, even seemingly innocuous ones, can be compromised at any point in the supply chain, long before it reaches the end user.
This incident serves as a potent reminder of the importance of considering low-tech alternatives for secure communication and the need for heightened awareness regarding supply chain vulnerabilities in an increasingly interconnected world. The shift to pagers by Hezbollah is not merely a tactical adjustment; it’s a strategic commentary on the inherent vulnerabilities of our high-tech reliance and the enduring relevance of low-tech solutions in specific security contexts.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article and see more than 300 UMBC articles available in The Conversation.
