In late December 1979, the Soviet Union launched a significant military intervention in Afghanistan, deploying thousands of troops and swiftly establishing complete military and political dominance over Kabul and large parts of the nation. This marked the beginning of a decade-long, brutal endeavor by Moscow to quell the escalating Afghan civil war and ensure the survival of a friendly, socialist regime on its southern border. This event became a pivotal moment in the Cold War, representing the only instance where the Soviet Union invaded a country outside of the Eastern Bloc, a strategic decision that drew widespread international condemnation. While the scale and speed of the Soviet military operation, along with the boldness of its political objectives, undoubtedly constituted an invasion, the term “intervention” better encapsulates these events as the culmination of increasing Soviet influence that had been building since 1973. Soviet leaders in the Kremlin likely believed that a swift and decisive military takeover would solidify Afghanistan’s position as a prime example of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted that once a nation embraced socialism, Moscow would never permit its return to capitalism. The United States and its Western allies, guided by their own containment policy, strongly denounced the Soviet action in Afghanistan and implemented various measures aimed at pressuring Moscow to withdraw its forces.
Soviet combat vehicles move through Afghanistan. (Department of Defense)
The roots of the Soviet invasion can be traced back to the summer of 1973 when Mohammed Daoud, the former Afghan Prime Minister, led a successful coup against King Zahir. Although Daoud was more of a nationalist than a socialist, his coup relied on pro-Soviet elements within the military and political spheres. Since 1955, Moscow had been a key provider of military training and equipment to Afghanistan; by 1973, approximately one-third of active Afghan troops had received training in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Daoud enjoyed the backing of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a party founded in 1965 based on Marxist ideology and loyalty to Moscow. In 1967, the PDPA fractured into two main factions: the Parchamists, led by Babrak Karmal (who initially supported Daoud), and the Khalqis, led by Noor Taraki. For the next five years, Daoud faced the challenging task of governing Afghanistan’s diverse Islamic tribal regions while also attempting to reconcile the deep divisions within the PDPA. However, the more radical Khalq faction never fully accepted Daoud’s authority, and Karmal viewed the coup largely as a means to advance his own power. In response to these pressures, Daoud sought to distance Afghanistan from Soviet influence, improve relations with the United States, and reduce the influence of radical factions within his government and the military.
Daoud’s attempt to navigate a middle path ultimately ended in tragedy. On April 28, 1978, military personnel aligned with Taraki’s Khalq faction stormed the presidential palace, where Daoud and his family were executed. In the aftermath, Taraki assumed the position of Prime Minister, and in an effort to bridge the PDPA’s internal divisions, Karmal was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. In Washington, this communist revolution triggered alarm bells. The Carter administration recognized that Taraki would reverse Daoud’s efforts to steer Afghanistan away from Moscow’s orbit, and it initiated debates on whether to sever ties with Afghanistan or to recognize the Taraki regime in the hope of limiting Soviet influence. Despite President’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advocating for the former approach, President Carter sided with the State Department’s recommendation of recognition. Shortly after the revolution, Washington officially recognized the new government and soon appointed Adolph Dubs as its Ambassador to Afghanistan. Until his kidnapping and death at the hands of Afghan Shia dissidents in February 1979, Ambassador Dubs actively worked to foster positive relations with the Taraki regime, believing that U.S. support could serve as a counterbalance to Soviet influence.
However, the volatile nature of Afghan internal politics continued to complicate both U.S. and Soviet strategic maneuvering. In the summer of 1979, Hafizullah Amin, a long-time associate of Taraki who had become Deputy Prime Minister after the April Revolution, received intelligence about a Parcham plot, allegedly led by Babrak Karmal, to overthrow the Taraki government. Amin seized this opportunity to purge and execute numerous Parchamists, consolidating his own power in the process. Adding to the complexity, this internal conflict significantly undermined the Kabul government’s primary national objective: extending the communist revolution into the Islamic tribal regions beyond Kabul. By the winter of 1978, this program had provoked armed resistance across the country. In response to the escalating insurgency, Amin and Taraki traveled to Moscow to sign a friendship treaty that included a provision for direct Soviet military assistance should the Islamic rebellion threaten the regime’s stability. This insurrection intensified throughout the following year, and it became increasingly evident to the Soviets that Taraki was unable to prevent a full-scale civil war and the potential rise of a hostile Islamic government. By mid-1979, Moscow was actively exploring options to replace both Taraki and Amin and deployed combat troops to Bagram Air Base outside of Kabul. This deployment prompted the Carter administration to initiate a program of providing non-lethal aid to the Afghan mujahedeen, or Islamic insurgents. In August, a high-level Soviet military delegation arrived in Kabul to assess the deteriorating situation firsthand. U.S. officials interpreted this mission as a final Soviet attempt to bolster the Taraki regime, but also recognized the potential for it to be a precursor to a military takeover. Regarding the latter, most analysts in Washington believed that a full-scale Soviet occupation remained a possibility, but considered it unlikely due to the anticipated political and economic repercussions.
This assessment, however, was soon to be proven wrong. Amin, sensing that the Soviet mission was intended to strengthen Taraki at his expense, orchestrated the execution of Taraki in October—an act that deeply angered Moscow, leading to a significant buildup of Soviet combat units along its border with Afghanistan. At this critical juncture, Washington remained uncertain about the Soviet Union’s intentions: was Moscow planning a full-scale invasion, or was it still committed to preserving the April Revolution through other means? Analysts continued to doubt that Moscow would risk occupying the country, believing that the political and economic costs would be prohibitive. By the winter of 1979, facing widespread mutinies and an unstable leadership, the Afghan Army was increasingly unable to provide basic security for the government against the growing strength of Islamic fighters approaching Kabul. By this point, the Soviets were deploying motorized divisions and Special Forces into Afghanistan. Washington demanded an explanation for these military movements, but the Soviets ignored these inquiries. Finally, on Christmas Eve, the invasion commenced. Soviet forces assassinated Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as the Soviet Union’s puppet leader in Afghanistan.
Despite the Carter administration’s close monitoring of the Soviet military buildup from the beginning, its reaction to the invasion revealed that, until the very end, it held onto the hope that the Soviets would refrain from invading, mistakenly assuming that Moscow would conclude that the costs of invasion were simply too high. In response to the invasion, President Carter penned a strongly worded letter to Brezhnev condemning Soviet aggression. In his State of the Union address, he announced the Carter Doctrine, pledging to protect Middle Eastern oil supplies from further Soviet expansion. The administration also imposed economic sanctions and trade embargoes against the Soviet Union, called for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and significantly increased its support for the Afghan insurgents. Collectively, these actions represented Washington’s attempt to make the Soviet “adventure” in Afghanistan as costly and short-lived as possible. However, the conflict dragged on for ten years of brutal insurgency before Moscow finally withdrew, at a tremendous cost of millions of lives and billions of dollars. In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan was left a devastated nation, which ultimately paved the way for the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group, to seize power and later provide Osama bin Laden with a base of operations from which to launch terrorist attacks worldwide.
