Why Did Iraq Invade Kuwait? Discover the underlying reasons behind this historical event at WHY.EDU.VN, exploring the complex interplay of political ambitions, economic factors, and Saddam Hussein’s worldview. We provide detailed analysis of the historical, economic, and political factors contributing to this conflict, offering a comprehensive understanding of the invasion and its lasting impact. Dive into the depths of Gulf War causes.
1. Saddam Hussein’s Worldview and the Baathist Ideology
To truly understand why Iraq invaded Kuwait, one must first delve into the worldview of Saddam Hussein and the Baathist ideology that shaped his actions. At its core, Baathism, which translates to resurrection or revival in Arabic, was a revolutionary political movement that emerged in Syria in 1947. It rested on three pillars: Arab unity, anti-imperialism, and socialism. The central premise of Baathism was the belief that the Arab nation, once a proud and prosperous civilization, had been subjugated by foreign imperialists, resulting in discord and hindering its progress. Baathism sought to restore the Arab world’s past glory through unity, self-reliance, and economic development, enabling it to reclaim its place in the world.
Saddam Hussein’s connection to Baathism stemmed from his maternal uncle, Khairallah Talfah, who instilled in him a strong Arab nationalism, animosity toward British imperialism, and stories of ancient Iraqi glory. Talfah’s manifesto, titled Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies, published in 1981, revealed his political views and prejudices, leaving a lasting impression on Saddam’s political outlook.
In 1955, Saddam followed in Talfah’s footsteps and joined the Iraqi branch of the Baath Party, which then had only 289 members. Over the next decade and a half, the Baathists participated in coups and partisan power struggles, gradually gaining influence in Iraqi politics. In 1968, they seized power in their own right through a revolution. Saddam initially served as head of internal security and deputy chairman of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council under his cousin, President Ahmed Hassan al Bakr, before assuming power himself in 1979.
Until the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Saddam’s relationship with the United States was characterized by suspicion and vacillation between tentative friendship and open enmity. Although Baathist ideology didn’t preclude alliances of convenience with the United States, as seen during the war with Iran, Saddam viewed Washington as the heir to the European empires of old. According to him, Arabs had once seen the United States as a beacon in their fight against “old imperialism” but later discovered that it had merely supplanted European imperialists in the Middle East after World War II.
Saddam Hussein delivering a speech at the Arab Cooperation Council summit in Amman, Jordan, reflecting his views on Arab unity and anti-imperialism
Saddam’s relations with the United States were intertwined with his perception of Zionism and the state of Israel. Like other Baathists of his generation, Saddam believed in the anti-Semitic theory that Jews wielded significant influence over Western media and finance, enabling them to dictate U.S. policy toward the Middle East. He maintained that Zionism was the root of the Arab world’s problems and that all “bad things” that had befallen the Arabs could be traced back to the Jewish state.
Saddam’s preoccupation with Arab weakness in relation to Israel reflected the insecurity that permeated his politics. Imperialism and Zionism had not only defeated but humiliated the Arab states. He believed it was his duty to resurrect the Arab nation, reclaim its glorious ancient history, and redeem its dignity in modern times.
2. The Osirak Reactor Airstrike and Its Impact
Perhaps the most significant event that shaped Saddam’s view of Israel was the Israeli airstrike on the Osirak nuclear reactor outside Baghdad in 1981. Saddam saw the attack as an attempt to prevent the advancement and rise of the Arab nation in science and technology.
The strike confirmed his belief that Israel would not tolerate any challenge to its scientific supremacy and validated his suspicions of U.S. duplicity. The Iran-Contra affair, in which the White House secretly sold arms to Tehran in exchange for the release of American hostages, further reinforced Saddam’s conviction that the United States continued to collude with Iran at the expense of Iraq.
The remnants of the Osirak nuclear reactor after the Israeli airstrike, highlighting the event’s impact on Saddam Hussein’s perception of Israeli hostility
Saddam believed that Zionism influenced U.S. policy toward the Middle East and that Zionist circles worked with Western imperialists to keep the Arabs in a state of conflict, economic underdevelopment, and scientific backwardness.
3. Initial Interactions with the Bush Administration (January – October 1989)
When George H.W. Bush assumed office in January 1989, Iraq was not a high priority on his list. His focus was primarily on assessing Gorbachev’s reforms, maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance, and addressing regional issues in the Third World. Even in the realm of Middle East policy, the administration prioritized efforts to initiate an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue rather than focusing on relations with Iraq.
The Bush administration’s initial lack of emphasis on Iraq reflected their confidence in the policy they had inherited from the Reagan administration. Although officially neutral in the Iran-Iraq War, the United States had leaned towards Baghdad since the early 1980s to contain the fundamentalist revolutionaries in Tehran, disrupt Baghdad’s tenuous relationship with the Soviet Union, and encourage Saddam to align with the “moderate,” Western-oriented Arab states.
To achieve these goals, Reagan had engaged with Baghdad through high-technology exports, intelligence cooperation, and economic assistance, including $3.2 billion in credit guarantees for the purchase of American agricultural goods under the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Credit Corporation.
Bush’s advisors supported this approach, recommending that he maintain Reagan’s policy of constructive engagement with Baghdad. They believed that the war with Iran might have transformed Iraq from a radical state challenging the system to a more responsible state working within it. They also saw Saddam’s desire for American trade and investment as an opportunity to distance Iraq from the Soviet Union and integrate it into a conservative alignment in foreign policy.
While human rights concerns were not to be disregarded, they should not dictate the course of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship. In October 1989, the new administration formalized these principles in National Security Directive 26, a product of its formal review of U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf.
Although Iraq was not a central focus for the Bush administration, the United States was a significant consideration in Saddam’s calculations. Initially, the Iraqi leadership was uncertain about the new U.S. president. Reagan had tried to assure the Iraqi government that “Irangate” was an exception and not part of a larger plan to favor Iran at Iraq’s expense. However, the arrival of a new administration could signal policy changes.
Fearing that Washington might sacrifice Baghdad to appease Tehran, Saddam sought to convince the Bush administration that Iraq would remain a reliable political and economic partner. In February 1989, he announced plans for a new constitution to legalize a multiparty system, ensure free elections, and protect freedom of the press. In the same month, Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz informed the U.S. embassy that Saddam wanted a “clean, clear start” with the new administration.
As a gesture of goodwill, Iraq agreed to provide a substantial sum as compensation for the 37 American sailors who died when an Iraqi fighter pilot mistakenly targeted the USS Stark in 1987.
At the same time, Iraq made efforts to assess the new U.S. president’s intentions. In March, Saddam dispatched Nizar Hamdun, the undersecretary of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, to convey his desire for warmer relations directly to Bush’s advisors in Washington. Hamdun, who had previously served as ambassador to the United States during the height of the war with Iran, was well-suited to deliver Saddam’s message of friendship.
During his visit to the State Department, Secretary of State James Baker assured Hamdun that, despite ongoing hostility in Congress regarding the regime’s earlier use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds, the Bush administration was eager to continue fostering closer relations with Iraq. Hamdun concluded from his meeting with Baker that the U.S. government recognized Iraq as a regional power that could be relied upon to address shared concerns in the broader Middle East. Baker’s cordial words also convinced the Iraqi leadership that Bush and his inner circle were more pragmatic and less ideological than their predecessors in the Reagan administration, making them potential partners.
Business considerations were also a primary concern for the leadership in Baghdad. In addition to its heavy human toll, the war with Iran had devastated the Iraqi economy. In the early 1980s, when declining oil revenues and international reserves were insufficient to finance the war, Saddam had sought assistance from Western creditors and friendly Arab states. By the end of the war, Iraq’s total external debt was estimated at $26 billion, not including an additional $40–50 billion in “debts in kind” to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states.
Given this situation, Saddam recognized that strong economic relations with the United States were essential for reviving the Iraqi economy. In June 1989, the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum, a trade association that had grown in influence along with the expanding bilateral trade relationship, sponsored a delegation of 25 American chief executive officers to visit Iraq and assess trade and investment opportunities in the post-war economy. To their delight, Saddam personally met with the visitors for a friendly two-hour discussion.
The unprecedented personal audience granted by the Iraqi president to the delegation “constituted a deliberate signal of willingness to do business with Americans,” Glaspie reported to Washington. Even more surprising was Saddam’s statement that he had put aside his suspicions of American intentions. “Our decision to cooperate with you is solid,” he told his visitors. “We remember Irangate, but we are more interested in looking ahead.”
Of course, the growing U.S.-Iraqi relationship was not without tensions. By the end of the summer of 1989, three issues were on the horizon. The first was the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro affair. In August 1989, the FBI discovered that the bank’s Atlanta branch had provided Iraq with $4 billion in unauthorized loans, which Baghdad then used to purchase sensitive military equipment. Because the bank was responsible for issuing a large proportion of U.S. government-backed loans to Iraq for the purchase of American agricultural commodities, the Department of Agriculture and other federal agencies decided to disburse Iraq’s next $1 billion of Commodity Credit Corporation credits in two $500-million tranches: the first in October 1989, and the second sometime in early 1990, pending the results of the investigation into Banca Nazionale del Lavoro’s anomalous lending practices.
The second issue was Saddam’s growing fear of hostile Israeli intentions toward his regime. Since the end of the war with Iran, authorities in Baghdad had voiced concerns, both publicly and privately, that Israel was secretly planning to repeat the 1981 airstrike on the Osirak nuclear reactor, this time targeting other nuclear or unconventional weapons installations.
The third issue was that Saddam began receiving reports that the United States was spreading rumors that Iraq harbored hostile intentions toward its Arab neighbors in the Gulf. According to one Iraqi account, Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd informed Baghdad that a U.S. official encouraged Riyadh to be wary of the dangers posed by Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi government believed that the commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, spread similar rumors during his October visits to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
4. The End of History on the Euphrates (November 1989 – February 1990)
As the Eastern Bloc revolutions and Soviet retrenchment unfolded, they inadvertently intensified Iraq’s suspicions of America’s and Israel’s intentions. Saddam and his advisors recognized that the geopolitical certainties of the past 40 years were rapidly disappearing. However, while the bipolar Cold War was becoming a thing of the past, the contours of a post-Cold War order remained unclear.
In a speech delivered on November 7, 1989, Saddam publicly presented an initial interpretation of how the collapse of communism might affect the Middle East. He identified two key trends that would shape global affairs in the near future: rising global, and particularly American, dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and retrenchment across the communist world.
These trends raised the likelihood of foreign “plundering” of Gulf oil in the coming five years. Saddam’s conflation of his fear of American designs on the Persian Gulf with Soviet decline exacerbated suspicions of U.S. intentions within the Iraqi government.
Although Saddam’s speech received little attention in the United States, it was inspired by two seemingly harmless American actions. First, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger warned that the world had become increasingly dependent on the gulf region for its energy resources, making the principal nations of the region more influential and tempting as targets. This op-ed caught the attention of senior officials in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry.
Second, Glaspie questioned Iraqi officials about why they maintained such a large standing army even after the war with Iran. Glaspie’s comment aroused Saddam’s suspicions, especially following reports that the United States was spreading rumors of Iraq’s hostile intentions toward its neighbors.
Iraq’s concerns about America’s intentions grew alongside the accelerating pace of the Eastern Bloc revolutions. In December, Saddam ordered Iraq’s ambassadors in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, Vietnam, and Cuba to return to Baghdad for a discussion of the upheaval sweeping the communist world.
Their discussions centered on how Iraq would fare in the absence of a bipolar world order. The attendees reached some concerning conclusions. They believed that if Gorbachev had relinquished hegemony over the Soviet Union’s traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, he would not hesitate to sacrifice friends in the Middle East as well.
They also feared that Moscow’s inward focus would give Washington control over the U.N. Security Council, where the Soviet Union had previously checked American imperialism. The United States might now use its unrestrained power to assert hegemony over Persian Gulf oil, upon which its future economic competitors, Japan and Europe, depended.
It was argued that Iraq, with its technological, industrial, and human potential, posed the greatest obstacle to Zionist plans to make Israel the “center of gravity” in the Middle East. It was for this reason that Israel had struck the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and covertly supported Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War. Now, Israel was working to gain new allies in a democratizing Eastern Europe, which would allow the Zionists and their new supporters to “cooperate with Iran” and “surround and isolate Iraq.”
Near the end of 1989, Saddam’s apprehension about communist retrenchment combined with renewed fears that Israel was on the verge of launching a preemptive strike on Iraq. There were rumors in late 1989 that Israel was planning to bomb dams along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to flood Baghdad. Additionally, the Iraqi intelligence community began receiving numerous warnings from Saddam’s office that Israel intended to strike Iraq’s nuclear reactors and biological and chemical weapons facilities.
The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of the Cold War and exacerbated Saddam Hussein’s fears about a shifting global balance of power
The resurgence of warnings about an Israeli attack in December 1989 was almost certainly related to Iraq’s test launch of a new rocket system that month. The Iraqi government claimed that the rocket would be used for peaceful purposes, such as carrying satellites into space, but American analysts warned that the test indicated Iraq’s progress toward producing a three-stage intermediate-range ballistic missile.
In response to the launch, the State Department expressed concern over the “destabilizing effects” of missile proliferation in the Middle East. Saddam dismissed the “double standards” of his American and Israeli critics, stating that any attempt by Israel to strike Iraqi scientific or military facilities would be met with a precise response, using all available means, in accordance with the right to self-defense.
As 1990 began, another consequence of the end of the Cold War, the mass Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel, inadvertently intensified Saddam’s fears of an Israeli attack. In a speech on January 14, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir proclaimed that “big immigration requires Israel to be big as well.”
The new Soviet aliyah, combined with Shamir’s implication that it would allow Israel to retain the occupied territories, triggered panic across the Arab Middle East. There were fears that Soviet immigration could lead to a new historical catastrophe for the Arabs.
Saddam was greatly concerned about the immigration issue. He spent almost an hour discussing it with visiting U.S. congressmen in mid-January. During a visit to Cairo later that month, Saddam told reporters that the arrival of so many new Israelis would only strengthen the hand of Zionist “zealots” focused on “expansion” and “aggression.”
5. Storm Clouds Gather (February 1990)
In the weeks following the Arab Cooperation Council summit, several incidents further strained Baghdad’s relations with Washington. The Iraqi government’s execution of Farzad Bazoft, an Iranian-born journalist based in the United Kingdom, sparked international outcry. Bazoft had been investigating a mysterious explosion at a weapons plant outside Baghdad and was accused of espionage. Despite appeals for clemency, he was executed on March 15.
One week later, Gerald Bull, a Canadian-born artillery expert assisting Iraq in developing a “supergun,” was assassinated in Brussels. The Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, was suspected of being responsible. Additionally, customs officials at Heathrow Airport intercepted an Iraq-bound shipment of electrical capacitators that could be used to trigger nuclear devices.
On April 2, Saddam addressed the international uproar over the Bazoft execution, the Bull assassination, and the Heathrow sting, denouncing them as part of an “imperialist-Zionist” campaign to delegitimize his government and pave the way for an Israeli airstrike. He denied that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program but acknowledged the existence of Iraq’s chemical weapons arsenal, stating that Iraq would “make fire eat half of Israel if it tries to attack Iraq.”
Saddam’s threat against Israel was not merely a ruse to divert attention from his aggressive plans. Evidence suggests that he genuinely feared an imminent Israeli strike. The circumstances in the spring of 1990 reminded the Iraqi leadership of the period leading up to the Israeli strike on the Osirak reactor.
Saddam’s threat to “make fire eat half of Israel” was an expression of his genuine fear that the United States and Israel intended to exploit Soviet retrenchment to undermine his regime in their pursuit of hegemony in the Persian Gulf.
Whether Israel was actually preparing to attack Iraq in the spring of 1990 remains uncertain. However, the Bush administration began warning Israel against striking Iraq and made this clear to Baghdad.
6. The Kuwait Factor (May – August 1990)
By early May, there was widespread speculation about a potential war between Iraq and Israel. It was surprising, then, when Saddam abruptly turned his attention to his Kuwaiti neighbors in June and July.
Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait had been simmering beneath the surface for some time. Since the end of the war with Iran, Baghdad had repeatedly raised the long-standing border dispute with Kuwait, which seemed more interested in settling Iraq’s outstanding debts.
In January 1990, Iraq asked Kuwait to forgive its $8 billion debt and provide an additional $10 billion for reconstruction, but Kuwait refused. During a closed session of the Arab Cooperation Council summit the following month, Saddam stated that Iraq needed $30 billion, reportedly telling his counterparts, “Go and tell them in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf that if they don’t give it to me, I will know how to take it.”
Moreover, Kuwait was producing oil in excess of its OPEC quota in order to lower oil prices, which it believed would stimulate higher global oil consumption and discourage the search for substitutes. However, low oil prices undermined Iraq’s efforts to revitalize its economy, rebuild its infrastructure, provide services to its population, and maintain its military spending.
While Saddam certainly hoped to gain financial and territorial concessions from Kuwait after the Iran-Iraq War, it would be a mistake to assume that the Iraqi leadership had developed a plan to invade, occupy, and annex Kuwait.
Saddam’s allegations against the Kuwaiti monarchy in the spring and summer of 1990 were intertwined with his interpretation of the American-Israeli conspiracy he believed was already underway. He accused the Al Sabah family of conspiring with the Americans against Iraq. He stated that Washington was encouraging Gulf oil overproduction to depress prices, thereby undermining the Iraqi economy and military preparedness, while Israel was planning a military strike to destroy some of Iraq’s vital targets.
An Arab League summit in late May highlighted the intermingling of Saddam’s preoccupation with the end of the Cold War and his suspicions of the Kuwaiti royal family. The summit addressed the immediate danger of Israeli expansionism and the broader global shifts of which the Soviet aliyah was symptomatic, namely Soviet reform and retrenchment.
During a private session of the summit, tensions escalated between Saddam and the Kuwaiti emir, whom Saddam accused of waging a “new war” against Iraq through oil overproduction. Economic conditions in Iraq continued to worsen.
Iraq’s deteriorating economy, the apparent intransigence of Kuwait, the intensifying Western “campaign” against Baghdad, mass Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel, and the prospect of preemptive Israeli airstrikes on Iraq all reinforced Saddam’s belief that a conspiracy was underway, leading him to consider drastic measures against Kuwait.
On June 27, Saddam convened a meeting of his closest advisors to deliberate their options. The Iraqi government developed two plans: Plan A, which involved seizing the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiyan and making a limited incursion into Kuwaiti territory, and Plan B, which entailed seizing all of Kuwait. Until late July, Plan A was the more likely option, but Saddam eventually concluded that taking all of Kuwait would give him greater leverage to deter the United States and Israel.
The summer of 1990 saw tensions between Iraq and Kuwait, Israel, and the United States reach new heights. On July 15, Aziz sent a letter to the Arab League secretary-general formally outlining Iraq’s complaints against Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, accusing Kuwait of encroaching on Iraqi territory during the Iran-Iraq War and stealing $2.4 billion worth of oil from the Rumaila oilfield. Two days later, Saddam accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of complicity in the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy to subvert his regime. Days later, Baghdad began mobilizing troops toward the border with Kuwait.
On July 25, Glaspie met with Saddam, where he expressed his suspicions that Washington secretly aimed to undermine him. He stated that American behavior over the past year had revived his doubts and that he would never bow to foreign plots to crush Iraq, even if it meant war.
Nevertheless, Glaspie left the meeting feeling optimistic about the possibility of peacefully resolving the disputes with Kuwait. However, the atmosphere in Baghdad was far from calm. An Israeli minister threatened that Israel was capable of countering Iraq’s threats with its own chemical weapons arsenal. Iraqi authorities seized on this threat as further evidence of Israeli plans to attack.
Kuwait City in ruins following the Iraqi invasion, illustrating the devastating consequences of the conflict
On August 1, negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait in Jeddah broke down. Upon returning to Baghdad, the Iraqi delegation immediately met with Saddam and other senior officials to weigh their options. They believed that the inflexibility of the Kuwaiti delegation indicated that Kuwait was acting at the behest of the United States. The latest Iraqi intelligence confirmed that Israel had selected its targets, which included the Republican Palace, military leadership headquarters, and the Tuwaitha nuclear research center. Believing that Israeli airstrikes might begin at any moment, Saddam and his advisors resolved that removing the Kuwaiti royal family was their only escape from the American-led plot in which they were ensnared.
7. Conclusion: The Invasion of Kuwait
In conclusion, the invasion of Kuwait was not merely a result of parochial economic interests or a long-standing border dispute. Rather, it was the culmination of Saddam Hussein’s worldview, his fears of Soviet retrenchment, Israeli hostility, and unchecked American power. The Bush administration, in turn, seized upon Iraq’s aggression as an opportunity to solidify unipolarity, using the Gulf crisis as a stage to enact a post-Cold War order.
Understanding the complex interplay of factors that led to the invasion of Kuwait requires a comprehensive approach that considers the historical, political, and economic context of the time. At WHY.EDU.VN, we strive to provide accurate, reliable, and insightful answers to complex questions, helping our users understand the world around them. If you have further questions or wish to delve deeper into this topic, please visit our website at WHY.EDU.VN or contact us at 101 Curiosity Lane, Answer Town, CA 90210, United States, or Whatsapp: +1 (213) 555-0101. Our experts are ready to provide detailed answers and explore different perspectives on this pivotal moment in history.
FAQ Section
Q1: What were Saddam Hussein’s primary motivations for invading Kuwait?
A: Saddam Hussein’s motivations were complex, including economic factors, territorial disputes, and a deep-seated belief in a conspiracy against Iraq involving Kuwait, the United States, and Israel.
Q2: How did the end of the Cold War influence Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait?
A: The end of the Cold War led to Saddam Hussein’s fear of unchecked U.S. power and the potential for American hegemony in the Persian Gulf, influencing his decision to invade.
Q3: What role did Kuwait’s oil production policies play in the invasion?
A: Kuwait’s oil overproduction, which depressed oil prices, undermined Iraq’s economy and fueled Saddam Hussein’s belief that Kuwait was part of a conspiracy to weaken Iraq.
Q4: Was the invasion of Kuwait a sudden decision or a long-planned strategy?
A: While tensions had been building, the decision to invade was not a long-planned strategy but rather a reaction to perceived threats and economic pressures, culminating in a last-minute decision.
Q5: How did Saddam Hussein view the United States’ role in the Middle East?
A: Saddam Hussein viewed the United States with suspicion, believing it was influenced by Zionist interests and aimed to undermine Iraq’s power in the region.
Q6: Did the United States give Iraq a “green light” to invade Kuwait?
A: The United States did not explicitly give Iraq a green light, but ambiguous statements by U.S. officials may have been misinterpreted by Saddam Hussein, contributing to his decision to invade.
Q7: What was the significance of the Israeli airstrike on the Osirak reactor in 1981?
A: The airstrike reinforced Saddam Hussein’s belief that Israel would not tolerate any challenge to its scientific supremacy and validated his suspicions of U.S. duplicity.
Q8: How did the mass Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel affect Saddam Hussein’s calculations?
A: The immigration heightened Saddam Hussein’s fears of Israeli expansionism and contributed to his belief that a conspiracy was underway to weaken Iraq.
Q9: What were the immediate consequences of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait?
A: The immediate consequences included international condemnation, economic sanctions, and the eventual U.S.-led military intervention to liberate Kuwait.
Q10: What is the lasting impact of the invasion of Kuwait on the Middle East?
A: The invasion and subsequent Gulf War had a profound and lasting impact on the Middle East, reshaping regional alliances, leading to long-term instability, and altering the geopolitical landscape.
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