Robert Musil, the insightful Austrian novelist, delivered a compelling lecture titled ‘On Stupidity’ in Vienna in 1937, years before his exile from Nazism. In this lecture, Musil proposed that stupidity is not merely a lack of intellect or ‘dumbness.’ He argued that dumbness is straightforward, almost ‘honorable,’ while stupidity is a distinct and more perilous phenomenon. This danger arises precisely because individuals with high intelligence can still exhibit profound stupidity. This raises crucial questions about the very nature of stupidity: What is it truly? How does it intersect with morality and ethics? Is stupidity a form of prejudice? And why does it manifest so unevenly, with individuals displaying brilliance in one domain and utter foolishness in another? While Musil attributed stupidity to pretentiousness, a concept rooted in the Vienna of his time, his fundamental questions about stupidity’s essence and its inherent dangers remain acutely relevant today. Understanding Why Are People So Stupid requires a deeper exploration beyond simple intellect.
Stupidity, in its essence, is a specific type of cognitive failure. In simple terms, it emerges when individuals lack the appropriate conceptual tools to effectively navigate and understand a situation. This deficiency leads to an inability to properly interpret events and a tendency to force complex phenomena into simplistic and distorted frameworks.
A stark illustration of this can be seen in the tragic miscalculations of the British high command during World War I. Accustomed to the strategies of 19th-century cavalry warfare, they attempted to apply these outdated concepts to the realities of trench warfare. One subordinate of Field Marshal Douglas Haig aptly described their flawed thinking, noting they viewed trenches as ‘mobile operations at the halt’ – fluid battle lines inexplicably frozen in place for years. This conceptual inadequacy, beyond any lack of resources, severely hindered their strategic thinking. They suffered from a form of ‘conceptual obsolescence’, a failure to adapt their cognitive toolkit to the unprecedented demands of modern warfare.
Stupidity, therefore, often arises when individuals or groups rely on outdated conceptual frameworks to interpret novel situations, leading to a distorted understanding of reality. It is important to differentiate this from simple mistakes. Errors occur for numerous reasons. Stupidity, however, represents a particular and persistent source of error rooted in inadequate conceptual tools. Philosophers have historically focused on the irrationality of failing to act in accordance with one’s goals – for instance, someone wanting to get fit but neglecting to use their running shoes. The solution to such issues often lies in willpower and motivation. Stupidity is fundamentally different. It’s not about lacking motivation but lacking the necessary intellectual equipment itself. Overcoming stupidity requires not just willpower but, more fundamentally, developing new ways of perceiving ourselves and the world around us.
It’s crucial to recognize that stupidity is not inversely related to intelligence. Haig, for example, was undoubtedly intelligent. In fact, intelligence can sometimes exacerbate stupidity by enabling elaborate rationalizations of flawed concepts. Consider the famous example of Harry Houdini and Arthur Conan Doyle. Houdini, the master illusionist, demonstrated to Conan Doyle, the creator of Sherlock Holmes, the simple tricks behind spiritualist séances, which Conan Doyle fervently believed in. Instead of accepting the rational explanation, Conan Doyle concocted a convoluted counter-argument, claiming that true mediums would intentionally appear fraudulent to conceal their genuine abilities. This illustrates how intelligence can be employed to defend and reinforce stupid beliefs, rather than dispel them.
While conceptual obsolescence provides one lens through which to view stupidity, a misguided form of innovation can also contribute. This occurs when societies adopt conceptual frameworks from vastly different contexts without critical adaptation. The global discourse on social justice, for example, is heavily influenced by ideas and terminology originating in the United States, a nation with a unique historical and cultural context. Blindly applying this framework to other countries, particularly those with different histories of class and racial dynamics (such as nations relying on white migrant labor from Eastern Europe or those with more complex racial histories like South Africa), carries significant conceptual and social risks. This uncritical transfer can lead to a form of stupidity, where imported concepts distort the understanding of local realities.
Stupidity possesses two characteristics that make it particularly dangerous compared to other human failings. Firstly, unlike individual character flaws, stupidity is often a collective attribute of groups or traditions. We acquire most of our concepts and mental tools from the societies we grow up in. If Haig’s primary problem had been laziness, replacing him with an energetic general would have been a straightforward solution. However, if Haig’s limitations stemmed from being trapped within the outdated conceptual framework of 19th-century military tradition, the challenge becomes far more complex. Overcoming this requires introducing a new conceptual framework and fostering a new sense of identity and military ethos. Once stupidity becomes entrenched in a group or society, eradicating it is a difficult undertaking. Creating, disseminating, and internalizing new concepts is a complex and arduous process.
Secondly, stupidity is self-perpetuating. Its ambiguous nature allows it to breed further stupidity. If stupidity is defined by employing the wrong tools for a given task, then the very definition of “stupid action” is task-dependent. A hammer, perfectly suited for driving nails, is useless for tightening screws. In politics, where stupidity appears particularly contagious, a simplistic slogan can resonate deeply with a voter who perceives the world in similarly simplistic terms. This creates a perverse dynamic where stupidity, ironically, can become effective within a specific environment. A kind of cognitive inadequacy can be inadvertently rewarded and reinforced. It is crucial to distinguish this observation from condescending criticisms of the ‘other side’ as unintelligent or uneducated. Stupidity is not limited by educational attainment; it is more accurately characterized as a feature of a political culture rather than an individual’s intellect and must be addressed at that systemic level.
Musil’s somewhat lenient view of ‘honorable’ dumbness is, in retrospect, dangerously complacent, particularly when considering its potential role in phenomena like the anti-vaccination movement. However, it’s important to recognize that mere dumbness is rarely the primary threat. Behind nearly every movement characterized by dumb ideas, you will find individuals exhibiting a more insidious form of stupidity guiding the charge.
The domain-specificity of stupidity – why individuals can be brilliant in one area and foolish in another – becomes clearer when viewed through the lens of conceptual tools. The relevant concepts are often specific to particular domains. Furthermore, many situations might not represent full-blown stupidity but mimic its effects. Consider someone who ignores clear signs of infidelity and then later asks, ‘How could I have been so stupid?’ In such cases, the issue isn’t pure stupidity; the concept of betrayal is widely understood. Instead, it’s a case of ‘acting as if stupid.’ The individual isn’t lacking the concept of betrayal, but rather, it’s effectively ‘offline,’ inaccessible due to emotional or psychological barriers. In these instances, people possess the necessary intellectual tools but, unknowingly or unwittingly, block their access. This contrasts with dumbness; we can make ourselves act stupid, but we cannot make ourselves dumb.
Stupidity, therefore, is a challenging problem to address. This difficulty is amplified by its interaction with other vices; stubbornness can prevent us from re-evaluating our failing concepts. However, understanding the true nature of stupidity offers a more optimistic perspective. Viewing political opponents solely as cynical Machiavellians reduces complex issues to a zero-sum power struggle. Attributing their actions solely to dumbness suggests an irredeemable flaw, often projected onto those with less formal education in hierarchical societies. Both perspectives offer a false sense of security: we can easily reassure ourselves that we are neither cynical nor dumb. Yet, we may still be entangled in the web of stupidity. If history is any guide, future generations will likely find aspects of our current morality incomprehensible – wondering, ‘How could decent people have ever believed that?’ To avoid being judged as morally reprehensible, they might have to conclude that we were, in some respects, simply stupid.
