President Jimmy Carter’s legacy is marked by numerous significant foreign policy decisions, and among the most debated is the transfer of the Panama Canal to Panama through the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. Ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1978, these treaties initiated the gradual handover of the Canal Zone and ultimately the Panama Canal itself to Panamanian control. This decision, often framed as “giving away” the canal, requires a deeper examination to understand the complex motivations and strategic thinking behind it.
President Jimmy Carter and General Omar Torrijos of Panama formally sign the Torrijos-Carter Treaties in a ceremony on September 7, 1977, marking a pivotal moment in the history of the Panama Canal.
The Canal’s Contentious Origins and Rising Tensions
To comprehend why President Carter pursued the treaties, it’s crucial to revisit the canal’s origins and the evolving relationship between the United States and Panama. In the early 20th century, the U.S., under President Theodore Roosevelt, sought to construct a canal across the Isthmus of Panama to dramatically shorten maritime routes between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Initially negotiating with Colombia, which then controlled Panama, the U.S. faced rejection of the Hay-Herrán Treaty by the Colombian Senate.
Seizing an opportunity, President Roosevelt supported Panama’s burgeoning independence movement. This support proved instrumental, and shortly after Panama declared independence, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was signed in 1903. This treaty granted the U.S. permanent control over a ten-mile wide strip of land across Panama, the Canal Zone, to build and operate the canal. The circumstances surrounding the treaty were deeply controversial; Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla, the Panamanian representative, was a French engineer with vested interests and lacked genuine authorization from the nascent Panamanian government. The Panama Canal opened in 1914, a marvel of engineering, but its foundation was built on a treaty many Panamanians deemed unjust and an infringement upon their sovereignty.
As the 20th century progressed, resentment in Panama over U.S. control of the Canal Zone intensified. Panamanians viewed the Canal Zone as a colonial enclave, a nation within a nation, symbolized by the American flag flying over their territory. This simmering discontent erupted in 1964. Riots broke out between U.S. residents of the Canal Zone and Panamanians, triggered by a dispute over the Panamanian flag’s right to be flown alongside the American flag. These riots led to a temporary break in diplomatic relations, underscoring the urgent need to address the Canal issue and renegotiate the existing treaty.
The Shifting Geopolitical Landscape and the Imperative for Negotiation
By the 1970s, several factors converged, making a new treaty not just desirable but essential for both the United States and Panama. Internationally, the Cold War was in full swing, and the U.S. was keen to maintain positive relations with Latin American nations and counter Soviet influence. Continued control of the Canal Zone, perceived as a vestige of American imperialism, was becoming a liability in U.S. foreign policy. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger articulated this concern in 1975, warning President Ford that failure to negotiate a new treaty would result in international condemnation and instability across Latin America.
Domestically, within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, there was a growing recognition that the 1903 treaty was unsustainable. The world had changed dramatically, and maintaining control through what was increasingly seen as a colonial-era agreement was detrimental to U.S. interests. The Nixon and Ford administrations initiated efforts to negotiate a new treaty, appointing seasoned diplomat Ellsworth Bunker to lead the U.S. delegation in 1973. Bunker’s approach shifted from perpetual U.S. control to perpetual U.S. use of the canal, a subtle but significant change that paved the way for progress.
However, the 1976 presidential election introduced uncertainty. While President Ford supported treaty negotiations, his challenger, Ronald Reagan, strongly opposed them. Initially, Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter also seemed to echo this opposition. During a debate with Ford, Carter stated he would not relinquish “practical control of the Panama Canal Zone any time in the foreseeable future.”
Carter’s Evolving Stance and the Path to the Treaties
Despite his initial campaign rhetoric, Jimmy Carter’s views on the Panama Canal began to evolve after his electoral victory. Crucially, key advisors like Sol Linowitz and Secretary of State-designate Cyrus Vance strongly advocated for a new treaty. They successfully persuaded Carter of its strategic importance, arguing that it was in the long-term interest of the United States to forge a cooperative relationship with Panama and rectify historical grievances.
Upon assuming office, President Carter made concluding the Panama Canal negotiations a top foreign policy priority. He appointed Linowitz as co-negotiator alongside Bunker, signaling his commitment to reaching an agreement. Carter understood that maintaining the status quo was no longer viable and that a treaty was necessary to secure long-term stability and U.S. access to the canal, albeit under a new framework of Panamanian sovereignty.
Negotiating and securing ratification were formidable challenges. Many in the U.S. Senate, particularly conservatives like Strom Thurmond, vehemently opposed relinquishing control of the Canal Zone. They viewed it as a strategic asset vital to U.S. security and questioned the trustworthiness of Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos, who had come to power through a coup and was viewed with suspicion by some as being sympathetic to communist ideologies. Senator Thurmond argued that losing the canal would contribute to the “encirclement of the United States.” Carter’s administration faced a second negotiation process within the U.S. Senate itself to gain the necessary two-thirds majority for ratification.
Securing Ratification and the Treaty’s Terms
The Carter administration launched a comprehensive campaign to garner public and Congressional support for the treaties. They organized numerous forums to explain the rationale behind the treaties, emphasizing the strategic benefits of a cooperative partnership with Panama and dispelling fears of jeopardizing U.S. interests. Omar Torrijos also played a crucial role, hosting U.S. Senators in Panama and assuring them of his commitment to a neutral and accessible canal, while also dispelling accusations of communist leanings. Even prominent conservative figure John Wayne, a friend of Torrijos, endorsed the treaties, lending further credibility to the effort.
Strategically, the negotiators decided to present two separate treaties to the Senate to address different concerns. The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, known as the Neutrality Treaty, guaranteed the canal’s neutrality and explicitly granted the United States the right to use military force to defend the canal against any threat to its neutrality. This addressed concerns about continued U.S. access and security. The second treaty, the Panama Canal Treaty, outlined the gradual transfer of the Canal Zone to Panama starting on October 1, 1979, and the complete handover of the Panama Canal itself on December 31, 1999.
Despite intense opposition and numerous attempts to add amendments that would undermine the treaties, the Carter administration prevailed, albeit narrowly. The Senate ratified the Neutrality Treaty on March 16, 1978, and the Panama Canal Treaty on April 18, 1978, both by a vote of 68 to 32 – just meeting the required two-thirds majority. Subsequently, Carter signed the implementation legislation in 1979, solidifying the treaties into law.
Long-Term Implications and a Reassessment of “Giving Away”
The Torrijos-Carter Treaties were a watershed moment in U.S.-Latin American relations. They effectively addressed long-standing grievances in Panama and across the region regarding U.S. dominance and intervention. By relinquishing control of the Panama Canal Zone, the United States shed the image of imperialism and fostered a more equitable relationship with Panama. This also served U.S. strategic interests by removing a major point of friction and potential instability in a region crucial to U.S. foreign policy.
While the treaties were a diplomatic triumph, relations between the U.S. and Panama faced new challenges after Torrijos’ death in 1981, culminating in the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 to remove Manuel Noriega from power. However, by 1999, relations had stabilized, and the peaceful handover of the canal occurred as planned. Panama has since administered the canal effectively, and it remains a vital artery of global commerce.
In conclusion, framing Jimmy Carter’s decision as simply “giving away” the Panama Canal is a gross oversimplification. It was a calculated and strategic move driven by a confluence of factors: the unsustainable nature of the 1903 treaty, rising Panamanian nationalism, the geopolitical context of the Cold War, and a pragmatic assessment of long-term U.S. interests. Carter and his administration recognized that true security and continued access to the canal were best ensured through cooperation and mutual respect, rather than continued control through a treaty perceived as unjust. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties, therefore, represent not a giveaway, but a far-sighted act of diplomacy that prioritized long-term stability and mutually beneficial relations over outdated notions of unilateral control.
