The ongoing war in Ukraine persists with a seemingly intractable and horrifying intensity. This brutal conflict raises a critical question: Why have Russia and Ukraine remained locked in combat for so long, inflicting immense damage upon each other? What obstacles prevent them from reaching a peace agreement and halting the bloodshed?
Drawing from research into the dynamics of war termination, it becomes evident that a core impediment to peace lies in the profound distrust between the warring parties regarding the adherence to any potential peace terms. Even when mutually acceptable terms for ending hostilities appear on the horizon, deep-seated skepticism about the adversary’s commitment to upholding the agreement can deter belligerents from embracing peace, thereby prolonging the conflict.
This pervasive lack of trust has been a hallmark of many protracted and devastating wars throughout history. In 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously dismissed peace overtures from Germany, recognizing the fundamental untrustworthiness of the Nazi regime. More recently, the Syrian civil war has tragically endured for over a decade, fueled by rebel factions’ profound lack of confidence in the Assad government’s promises. The anticipated actions after a peace accord is signed significantly influence the willingness of parties to accept such an accord in the first place.
An immense chasm of suspicion undeniably separates Moscow and Kyiv. Ukraine harbors deep mistrust towards Russia, stemming from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, its support for separatists in the Donbas region, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These actions blatantly violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, wherein Russia pledged to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and existing borders.
Adding to this complexity, some proposed peace terms, such as granting Russia permanent control over the economically vital and strategically crucial Donbas region, would fundamentally alter the balance of power in Russia’s favor. Ukraine would be particularly resistant to such an agreement, fearing that it would embolden a strengthened Russia to violate the peace deal in the future. This mirrors Churchill’s apprehension about negotiating with Hitler, fearing that any peace treaty would merely be a prelude to further German demands, ultimately leaving Britain vulnerable to complete subjugation.
Russia, judging by its official pronouncements, also expresses deep distrust of Ukraine and the West. It argues that NATO’s eastward expansion following the Cold War broke promises to respect Russia’s sphere of influence. Russian President Vladimir Putin asserted in May 2022, “Thus, an absolutely unacceptable threat to us was steadily being created right on our borders.”
Given these seemingly intractable positions, what viable paths remain? How can both sides extricate themselves from this devastating conflict, short of Russia completely overpowering Ukraine, and setting aside the improbable scenario of a pro-peace coup ousting Putin in Russia?
Historical precedents offer insights into potential solutions and approaches that may prove ineffective. In conflicts involving smaller nations, international peacekeeping forces can play a crucial role in mitigating mistrust. However, Russia’s significant size and its veto power within the United Nations Security Council effectively preclude the deployment of traditional peacekeepers in this context. Russia’s past disregard for monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in eastern Ukraine further underscores this limitation.
The “Korea option,” referencing the Korean War armistice, also presents substantial political hurdles. Despite ongoing deep distrust between the United States and North Korea and China in 1953, Washington agreed to a ceasefire that effectively ended the Korean War. This was feasible because South Korea’s security could be underpinned by a robust framework: a strong US-South Korea alliance, the sustained presence of a significant contingent of US troops on the Korean Peninsula, and the US nuclear deterrent.
Applying the “Korea option” to Ukraine encounters considerable political challenges, particularly in the immediate future. While the upcoming NATO Summit is expected to outline a “bridge” towards Ukraine’s eventual membership, building upon a 2008 commitment, the actual prospect of Ukraine joining NATO remains uncertain. NATO membership requires unanimous consent from all allies, and potential opposition from countries like Turkey, Hungary, or isolationist factions within the US Senate could block such a move. Indeed, reports suggest that in the spring of 2022, a potential path towards ending the war faltered partly because Washington appeared hesitant to consider providing Ukraine with a NATO-style security guarantee.
However, a viable path forward may exist. Imagine a post-war scenario where the West, instead of offering NATO membership, commits to empowering Ukraine to effectively deter future Russian aggression independently. This could be achieved through sustained military aid, training programs, and support for strengthening Ukraine’s domestic arms industry. A recent RAND Corporation report proposes a similar strategy, termed the “porcupine” approach. This strategy envisions transforming Ukraine into a formidable and unappealing target, discouraging Russia from further incursions.
This “porcupine strategy” offers several advantages. It allows NATO member states to avoid direct military involvement in any future Russia-Ukraine conflict, making it politically palatable for Western nations. For Ukraine, it provides a path to long-term security that doesn’t rely on optimistic assumptions about Russia’s future intentions. Furthermore, if this commitment is combined with a significant incentive, such as Russia’s withdrawal from Ukrainian territory seized after the 2022 invasion, it could become more appealing to Ukraine.
For Russia, the primary appeal of this option would be a tacit, if not explicit, assurance that Ukraine would not join NATO. Russia might find a non-membership commitment more credible if it receives guarantees that countries like Turkey and Hungary would veto Ukraine’s membership. Hungary’s recent actions to impede EU military aid to Ukraine suggest such a commitment from Hungary might be plausible.
This type of non-NATO concession could facilitate ending the war in another crucial way: providing a “fig leaf” for Putin. Emerging evidence suggests that Putin recognized the war as a miscalculation as early as March 2022. He may currently be receptive to finding a way to end the conflict, especially given Russia’s staggering military losses, estimated at around 150,000 deaths, and projections that Russia may deplete its stocks of tanks and combat vehicles by the summer of 2025. However, without a face-saving concession, Putin risks being overthrown by dissatisfied nationalist elites or military leaders. History shows that dictators can be ousted in this manner, as exemplified by the overthrow of Pakistani leader Yahya Khan after the 1971 Bangladesh War. “Fig leaves” can be instrumental in securing the support of pro-war factions within the military for peace agreements. In 1945, the US agreement to preserve the Japanese emperor’s position was pivotal in gaining the Japanese military’s acceptance of unconditional surrender.
Some might advocate for unilaterally pursuing the “porcupine strategy,” providing extensive aid to Ukraine without seeking Russian agreement to a peace deal. However, recent battlefield dynamics have demonstrated that even with substantial Western weaponry, Ukraine faces significant challenges in retaking territory through offensive operations. Therefore, a well-crafted peace agreement, endorsed by Russia, remains the most effective means for Ukraine to regain strategically important territory.
Critics might argue that the proposed deal is unappealing to all parties: Ukraine relinquishes its NATO aspirations and potentially accepts de facto Russian control over Crimea, the West commits to long-term military and economic support for Ukraine, and Russia withdraws from Ukrainian territory occupied after 2022. However, in both politics and business, viable agreements often emerge when all parties find aspects of the deal disagreeable.
Such a deal is becoming increasingly feasible as the war evolves into a bloody stalemate for all involved. As the immense costs of the conflict continue to escalate, all sides will become increasingly inclined to consider a politically difficult agreement to end the war. Furthermore, particularly if Donald Trump does not win the upcoming US presidential election and subsequently withdraw US support for Ukraine, neither Ukraine nor Russia can realistically envision achieving a decisive military victory in the foreseeable future.
To achieve peace, Ukraine and its Western allies must find ways to bridge the deep chasm of mistrust. This will undoubtedly be a formidable challenge. However, to avert further tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of casualties, this effort is imperative.
Further Reading
The view from Kyiv: Why Ukrainian NATO membership is in US interests
Women should play a central role in rebuilding Ukraine’s economy
Ukraine’s fight against Russia gets three boosts from the G7
